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What’s the use of a hashtag?  A case study 
 
 
 
What can a study of social media offer socio-legal studies?  Although there are now sophisticated 
techniques for the analysis of social media, socio-legal studies has yet to draw on them fully.  In this 
paper, we demonstrate how Twitter can produce insights about protest, law and legality.  We do so 
through a case study method, using the so-called bedroom tax.  We look at two different ways in 
which protest against the bedroom tax has been mobilised.  The first method involved challenging a 
policy in the courts using a test case or cases.  We discuss the litigation strategies and mess that they 
created.  We counterpose those strategies against those of four prolific ‘tweeps’ who, using a 
traditional interview method, participated in our study.  We argue that, despite the small number of 
participants, each of these people has in their own way been enormously influential and made things 
happen.  Our position is not an evaluative one – of the different strategies (which, in any event, 
overlap) – but that legality is mobilised in different ways, different purposes, and our tweeps may 
well have been, in this case study, rather more successful in their challenges than the lawyers. 
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Empirical researchers now have an enormous variety of methods and texts for their study.  However, 
the core argument in this paper is that social media offers a set of textual resources, which have 
been largely neglected by socio-legal scholars but which have significant purchase in thinking about 
the translations of legality in everyday life.  If we socio-legal scholars claim to be interested in the 
mundane, the everyday, and in the different mechanisms through which protest is voiced and power 
comes to be exercised horizontally, then our argument is that we must take social media seriously.  
To put it another way, the simple hashtag can become a powerful tool in the sense that it gets things 
moving, often operating at the interstices between a tactic and a strategy.1  That is, perhaps nothing 
is intended by a ‘post’ of a ‘microblog’ but it reaches a potentially huge and diverse audience who 
might themselves make things move.2 In this sense, hand-held so-called smart telephones enable 
social media to become a powerful intermediary among other tools.3   
To exemplify this argument, we use a case study of the bedroom tax,4 which we discuss in the first 
section.  We look at two different ways in which protest against the bedroom tax has been mobilised 
in the following two sections.  The first method is the now traditional method of challenging a policy 
in the courts using a test case or cases.5  We discuss the litigation strategies and mess that they 
created.  The second method is through social media.  Our social media of choice for this study is 
Twitter.6  But, as we make clear, ours is a study of legality.  Social media offers not only a seemingly 
passive dataset, but it also has significant purchase in thinking about the translations of legality in 
everyday life.  It may also  provide textual resources to resist a narrative  which ‘reinforces the image 
of there being a clear-cut divide between two sets of values – those of private, individualistic self-
interest on the one hand, and those of public, collective interests on the other’.7   
While some use the words ‘law’ and ‘legality’ interchangeably, or as explanations of each other,8 we 
adopt the distinction drawn by Ewick and Silbey.  On the one hand, we have formal law, which has 
                                                          
1 In de Certeau’s terms: The Practice of Everyday Life (1980), 36-7. 
2 If we are serious about ‘reassembling the social’, then, like Latour and others, we should be using and taking 
social media seriously: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/mixed_media 
3 So that ‘when you hook up with this circulating entity, you are partially provided with consciousness, 
subjectivity, actoriality etc’: B. Latour, ‘On recalling ANT’, in J. Law and J. Hassard (eds), Actor Network Theory 
and After (1999), 18. 
4 We discuss the label ‘bedroom tax’ below – our choice of this phrase to describe the rule is both political and 
because, as a result of the phenomena we are seeking to explain in this paper, namely social media, it has 
become instantly recognisable. 
5 H. Hodge, ‘A test case strategy’, in M. Partington & J. Jowell (eds), Welfare Law and Policy (1979); T. Prosser, 
Test Cases for the Poor: Legal Techniques in the Politics of Social Welfare (1983); C. Harlow & R. Rawlings, 
Pressure through Law (1992). We retain the scepticism that, when lawyers become involved, they tend to ‘… 
set about defining the “public interest” – and then think of the best way they can “satisfy” it.  In other words, 
the limits of the so-called “public interest” come to correspond mysteriously with the ability of the profession 
to “serve” this “interest”’: Z. Bankowski & G. Mungham, Images of Law (1976), 53. 
6 We could just as easily have chosen Facebook, through which much of the popular protest was (and 
continues to be) organised.  However, the fast-moving, short-form of Twitter provides a principal method of 
public popular protest against the bedroom tax as we discuss below. 
7 C. Barnett, ‘Publics and markets: What’s wrong with neoliberalism?’, in S. Smith, R. Pain, S. Marston and J. 
Jones III (eds), The Sage Handbook of Social Geographies (2010) p 271. 
8 P. Bourdieu, ‘The force of law’ (1987) Hastings Law Journal 813, where the distinction is drawn between law 
and the juridical field; L. Fox O’Mahony, ‘Property outsiders and the hidden politics of doctrinalism’, (2014) 
Current Legal Problems; B. Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns (2013), 
359. 
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its coupling with legal institutions; on the other hand, we have legality (or, rather, legalities), which 
‘… refer to the meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are commonly recognised 
as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what ends.  In this rendering, people may invoke and 
enact legality in ways neither approved nor acknowledged by the law.’9  We take this extension 
because the expanded version of legality allows what is screened out by the law to become visible; 
the law bottlenecks facts through its narrow head; but, when we start to think about legality (or 
legalities), other possibilities and strategies of resistance become possible. 
There are now sophisticated qualitative and quantitative methods available to us for analysing 
tweets.10  However, we draw on a set of four qualitative interviews conducted with the people 
behind the tweets, in which we asked about their purposes and programmes for action.  This 
method mirrors that used by Gerbaudo in a study of the use of social media in the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution, the indignados movement in Spain, and Occupy Wall Street.11  Gerbaudo’s purpose was 
to provide a counter to the “unbounded techno-optimism of [some] social media theorists”, on the 
one hand, as well as the techno-pessimism of other commentators through interviews with activists 
and observations of public gatherings.  We discuss this literature around the use of social media for 
protest activity, developed in anthropological and communications studies, in the third substantive 
section of this article, before drilling down to our specific case study and noting its distinctiveness.  
Our data offers a small sample, but it is a sample of the most prolific and political tweeters who were 
tweeting at that time (Summer, 2013) either solely or partly about the bedroom tax.  Our point 
about this sample, though, is that despite its size, each of these people has in their own way been 
influential, as we discuss in the third section.  If power is a mode through which an actor – a thing – 
gets another actor – another thing - to act or omit to act, then these actors (the combination of 
human and social media) are potentially getting others to act.12  It is not our intention to offer an 
evaluation or comparison of these methods of mobilisation.  Our suggestion is that we are able to 
draw attention to a series of narratives documenting how social media may occupy a lacuna created 
by the impossibility or implausibility of formal legal challenge to the reasonableness of central 
government policy that has been the subject of Parliamentary debate.  Those narratives suggest that 
social media proved capable of supporting and perhaps even supplanting this court-based 
endeavour.  
 
                                                          
9 P. Ewick and S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (1998), 22.  This extended 
version of legality should be distinguished from the elision sought by Alan Hunt in his revision of his Foucault 
and the expulsion of law thesis: A. Hunt, ‘Encounters with juridical assemblages: Reflections on Foucault, law, 
and the juridical’, in B. Golder (ed), Re-reading Foucault: On Law, Power and Rights (2012).  Hunt argues, at p 
78, that the ‘”legal” is characterized by its primary orientation to the making of, the content of, the 
interpretation and application of, and, in general, the priority accorded to, substantive rules’.  
10 For discussion, see S. Jeffares, Interpreting Hashtag Politics: Policy Ideas in an Era of Social Media (2014), ch 
4; A. Wilkie, M. Michael and M. Plummer-Fernandez, ‘Speculative method and twitter: Bots, energy and three 
conceptual characters’ (2014) 63 Sociological Review 79; E. Yardley and D. Wilson, ‘Making sense of “Facebook 
murder”?  Social networking sites and contemporary homicide’, (2015) 54(2) Howard Journal of Criminal 
Justice 109; T. Palmer, ‘Talking the (slut)talk, walking the (slut)walk: Negotiating a global movement in a local 
context’, unpublished paper on file with the author. 
11 P. Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism (2012). 
12 See for example, M. Foucault, ‘Afterword: The subject and Power’, in H. Dreyfuss and P. Rabinow¸ Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1983); B. Latour, Reassembling the Social (1996); E. Cloatre, 
Pills for the Poorest (2012). 
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The bedroom tax 
The bedroom tax forms part of a suite of social security reductions brought into effect during the 
Coalition government’s austerity turn.13  It is a bright line rule which prescribes a percentage 
reduction in housing benefit for the under-occupation of a property in the social sector.14  If a 
property is under-occupied by one bedroom, housing benefit is reduced by 14 per cent; if it is under-
occupied by two or more bedrooms, then housing benefit is reduced by 25 per cent.  The regulations 
do not define bedroom,15 although they do define who is entitled to a bedroom.16  The regulations 
mirror those affecting the private rented sector,17 with one significant difference: they came into 
effect immediately.18  Whereas the private rented regulations only came into effect on a new claim 
to housing benefit, the social sector regulations came into effect immediately (although there was a 
period between its announcement and coming into effect).19   
That was (and is) the formal law – the bright line rule inscribed by Statutory Instrument – but it was 
encrusted with justifications which, superficially, appeared plausible.  As we discuss below, appeals 
to fairness provide the basis for the Department for Work and Pensions’ cultural schema about the 
bedroom tax.  A simplistic binary (fair/unfair) provided the vehicle through which the policy was 
conveyed to the public. 
Two rationales were provided for the policy.20  First, too many households were under-occupying 
social housing so that best use was not being made of the stock.  The purpose then was to provide a 
financial incentive to move – although, that ‘incentive’ was effective coercion because of the 
inevitable rent arrears (and probably undefendable possession proceedings) that would follow from 
the reduction.  As Gibb notes, this rationale ‘stretches credibility compared with the simple sense 
that it is about cutting [housing benefit]’ because ‘… it is a remarkably poorly targeted under-
occupation policy and that critically behavioural assumption that people will down-size … are not 
                                                          
13 Others included the benefit cap, cuts to council tax allowance, and rises by CPI as opposed to RPI – see, 
further, K. Gibb, ‘The multiple policy failures of the UK bedroom tax’ (2015) International Journal of Housing 
Policy forthcoming.  For a critique, see ‘Social policy in an age of austerity’ (2012) 32 Critical Social Policy 
Special Issue. 
14 It is contained in the Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/3040 Reg 5; which inserted 
two new regulations into the Housing Benefit Regulations 200614  - Reg A13 and Reg B13. 
15 This came later in a DWP Circular HB/U6 2013, which suggested that ‘… the only consideration should be the 
composition of the household and the number of bedrooms as designated by the landlord, but not by 
measuring rooms’, para 4.  Provided a room was large enough to accommodate a single bed, it was to be 
regarded as a bedroom (para 5); see also Circular HB/U6 2014, and the critique: 
http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/2014/12/not-quite-minister/.  
16 Reg B13(5).  This was amended to include limited provision for foster carers (but not prospective adopter 
parents), members of the armed forces on operations, and a child who could not share a bedroom for medical 
reasons: Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations 2013 SI 2013/665; Housing Benefit and Universal Credit 
(Size Criteria) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations, SI 2013/2828.   
17 Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, Reg 13D 
18 There was, however, one (further) element of farce to these regulations.  It became apparent that those 
households who had been in consistent receipt of housing benefit from 1996 or earlier were not affected by 
the bedroom tax.  When this became known to the DWP, they closed down this ‘loophole.  The full story can 
be found at http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/2014/01/bedroom-tax-pre-1996-claims-exemption/; 
http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/2014/01/bedroom-tax-the-effect-of-the-pre-1996-claim-exemption/.  
19 The policy was announced in June 2010 and came into force in April 2013. 
20 These were provided in interviews to the media, for example on 1st April 2013, when the bedroom tax came 
into force: BBC News, “Iain Duncan Smith: Reforms ‘make work pay’”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
21993453. 
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borne out.  Indeed smaller properties in the market sector may induce higher [housing benefit] costs 
than larger social rented properties’.21   
Secondly, it was said to be unfair that people in the private rented sector were unable to under-
occupy, whereas people in the social sector could do so (although nothing was said about owner-
occupiers who under-occupy).  This provides a superficially compelling example of the current 
politics of austerity, which as Clarke and Newman describe, ‘combines an economic logic with a 
particular moral appeal (to shared sacrifice and suffering, to fairness and freedom, to a sense of 
collective obligation)’.22  This rationale suggests something that private landlords have been arguing 
for some time – a level playing field between social and private renting.  Indeed, the policy could 
plausibly be presented as a coerced exit, a type of quasi-privatisation, in the sense that households, 
faced with unaffordable social housing and nowhere to move within that sector, would see the 
private rented sector as the only alternative.23 
In any event, perhaps the real motivating factor was the need to find savings in the huge housing 
benefit black hole.  When the Coalition came to power, the housing benefit bill was around £21 
billion.  There was limited slack left to reduce the bill in the private rented sector – a consequence of 
the policy shift to market rent from 1989 – and, in any event, it was well-known that occupiers with 
some degree of reliance on housing benefit are discriminated against by private landlords.  The 
social sector was a target, in particular because a high proportion of occupiers were reliant on 
housing benefit.24  Further, the Coalition, in a quite remarkable volte face were making sweeping 
changes to what they referred to as ‘lifetime tenancies’, in part to secure mobility within the social 
sector and between social and private sectors.25  Against the £21 billion housing benefit bill, the 
bedroom tax was thought originally to save around £480 million and around £930 million over two 
financial years.26  Professor Becky Tunstall obtained the DWP’s modelling through a freedom of 
information request (although these contained no formulae) and found that, using real data 
provided by four large housing associations, the projected savings were unlikely to be achieved.27  
Further, there was some evidence that the policy acted to shunt costs from the DWP to local 
authorities and other housing providers.28 
                                                          
21 K. Gibb, ‘The multiple policy failures of the UK bedroom tax’ (2015) International Journal of Housing Policy 
forthcoming, 14. 
22 J. Clarke & J. Newman, ‘The alchemy of austerity’ (2012) 32 Critical Social Policy 299, 309. 
23 The data from the DWP’s study suggests that, where statistics were available, only a small proportion of 
affected households did move to the private rented sector (DWP, Evaluation of Removal of the Spare Room 
Subsidy, (2015), p 53) – but our point is that it provided a push-factor, not that it succeeded in so pushing.  
24 The impact assessment assumed a figure of around 63 per cent, taken from the English Housing Survey. 
25 DCLG, Local Decisions: A Fairer Future for Social Housing, Consultation (2010); Localism Act 2011; for a 
critique, see H. Carr, D. Cowan, & C. Hunter, Tenure Rights and Responsibilities (2010) 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/tenure-rights-responsibilities-full.pdf 
26 DWP, Housing Benefit: Size Criteria for People Renting in the Social Sector (2012); cf S. Wilcox & J. Perry, UK 
Housing review 2014 (2014), where the saving is reduced to £330 million.  Duncan-Smith, however, suggested 
that the bedroom tax had saved £1 billion: R. Prince, ‘Iain Duncan Smith: government’s controversial bedroom 
tax has saved taxpayers £1 billion’ Daily Telegraph, 21 March 2105.  The official statistics can be found at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/number-of-housing-benefit-claimants-and-average-weekly-spare-
room-subsidy-amount-withdrawal. 
27 This was because the DWP modelling was based on underestimates of tenant activity in response to the 
bedroom tax: B. Tunstall, Testing DWP’s Assessment of the Impact of the Social Rented Sector Size Criterion on 
Housing Benefit Costs and other Factors (2013). 
28 House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, Support for Housing Costs in the Reformed Welfare 
System, Fourth report of Session 2013-4, HC 720 (2014), paras 84-8. 
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The iniquity in the policy reflected the fact that it affected households which were allocated a long-
term social tenancy of a social property from which they would have to move on the basis that they 
now could not afford it.  Many allocation schemes had previously actively encouraged under-
occupation so that households could grow into a property, particularly in hard-to-let areas.29  The 
balance of housing supply in many areas affected, however, meant that they were unable to move 
(even if they had wanted to do so).30  Secondly, the impact assessment originally suggested that 
660,000 households would be affected (about 31 per cent of all working age housing benefit 
claimants living in social housing).31  Of that total figure, it was estimated that 420,000 had some 
form of a disability, so that the policy clearly targeted such households.   
What became apparent quickly was that the notion of a ‘spare’ bedroom for a considerable 
proportion of such households was a complete nonsense – such rooms were being used to store 
vital equipment, or where partners were unable to sleep together, or the room was simply too small.  
Thirdly, it was always accepted that the policy would have regional effects – the highest affected 
households lived in Welsh social housing (46 per cent) and the lowest in South West England social 
housing (20 per cent) – and those effects would be sensitive to supply:demand of social housing, so 
that rural areas would be particularly affected.32  Fourthly, it was said that those affected, including 
households with a disabled person, would be entitled to make a claim for a discretionary housing 
payment,33 but these payments were (at least at one time) thought to be short-term and, in any 
event, were discretionary and payable from a locally administered capped fund (so, once the fund 
was exhausted, there could be no more payments).34  The government allocated an increasing 
amount of money to such payments (£165 million in 2014-5),35 and some local authorities added to 
it from their housing revenue accounts,36 although it is now reducing. 
When the government finally published the interim report of the evaluation of the policy, it was not 
surprising that just 4.5 per cent of affected households had downsized within the social sector and 
1.5 per cent had moved to the private rented sector; 59 per cent of affected households were in rent 
arrears and there was widespread concern that households were being forced to make cuts to 
household essentials (food, heating, etc) and incurring other debts to pay the rent.  Because the 
bedroom eligibility related to children’s ages, some households were simply waiting for their child to 
reach the next age up.37  The final report,38 slipped out just before the seasonal holiday at the end of 
                                                          
29 See, for example, the discussion in A. Marsh et al, Piloting Choice-Based Lettings: An Evaluation (2003). 
30 For example, it was suggested that it would take between three and ten years for under-occupying 
households to down-size: K. Gibb, The Bedroom Tax in Scotland (2013). 
31 DWP, Housing Benefit: Size Criteria for People Renting in the Social Sector (2012), para 22.  The figure was 
subsequently down-sized itself to 547,342 and then 522,342.  It has been noted that the problem with this 
impact assessment was that ‘…analysis is unavoidably static and cannot take account of wider economic 
change. Further, available analysis tends to focus on the big picture – rarely does it consider variety in local 
housing market contexts’: K. Gibb, C. Leishman, G. Young & A. O’Sullivan, The Impact of the Housing Benefit 
Reforms on the Social rented Sector: A Study for the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (2013). 
32 Id, para 34. 
33 Discretionary Financial Assistance Regulations 2001/ 1167; DWP, Discretionary Housing Payments Manual, 
April 2013 (2013). 
34 These problems with the discretionary housing payments system were what persuaded the Court of Appeal, 
in part, to hold that the private rented regulations were unlawful: Burnip v Birmingham CC, Trengove v Walsall 
MBC, and Gorry v Wiltshire CC [2012] EWCA Civ 629, [45]-[47]. 
35 Housing Benefit Circular S1/2013, Circular S1/2014. 
36 W. Wilson, Housing Benefit: Discretionary Housing Payments, House of Commons Library SN/SP6899 (2014), 
3. 
37 CCHPR, Evaluation of Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy, Research Report No 882, Interim Report (2014). 
38 DWP, Evaluation of Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (2015). 
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2015 along with a number of other announcements and reports prejudicial to the government’s 
various positions,39 generally confirmed these interim findings, adding that many affected 
households were cutting back on household essentials (food, clothing and energy/utility bills) and 
non-essentials; and, further, the quantitative evidence of those affected suggested that up to 80 per 
cent ran out of money before the end of the week/month.40 
In an epilogue to the reprinted edition of their book, The Blunders of our Governments, King and 
Crewe suggest that the bedroom tax was a blunder, as they define it: ‘On the face of it, it would 
seem to be a straightforward case of cultural disconnect, with ministers and officials having little or 
no idea what practical effects their measure would have on those affected by it’.41  For Gibb, there 
are multiple policy failures.  What binds the two analyses together is a realisation that the projected 
savings to housing benefit were unlikely to materialise.42   
These sober analyses, however, do not reflect the degree of hardship suffered by households as a 
result of the bedroom tax.  Suicide attempts in housing and job centre offices were reported.43  
Social landlords’ business planning was affected.  Indeed, some social landlords sought to use the 
inherent flexibility in the regulation around the definition of ‘bedroom’ by re-defining the number of 
bedrooms in their properties so as to assist their occupiers.44  There was an episode in which the 
UN’s official rapporteur on adequate housing, Raquel Rolnick, recommended that the bedroom tax 
be suspended immediately and fully re-evaluated. Her report contained the following comment 
about the bedroom tax: 
In only a few months of its implementation the serious impacts on very vulnerable people 
have already been felt and the fear of future impacts are a source of great stress and 
anxiety. 
Of the many testimonies I have heard, let me say that I have been deeply touched by 
persons with physical and mental disabilities who have felt targeted instead of protected; of 
the grandmothers who are carers of their children and grandchildren but are now feeling 
they are forced to move away from their life-long homes due to a spare bedroom or to run 
the risk of facing arrears; of the single parents who will not have space for their children 
when they come to visit; of the many people who are increasingly having to choose between 
food and paying the penalty. Those who are impacted by this policy were not necessarily the 
                                                          
39 A. Sparrow, ‘Taking out the trash: How spin doctors wrangle the news’, The Guardian, 17th December 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/dec/17/taking-out-the-trash-how-spin-doctors-wrangle-the-news. 
40 Leading Baroness Lister to respond to Lord Freud that ‘I think we read different reports’, in the House of 
Lords debate on the final report. 
41 A. King & I. Crewe, The Blunders of our Governments, Reprinted (2014), 427. 
42 See notes 21 and 37 above. 
43 L. Clark, ‘Horror at “bedroom tax” suicide bid’, the Courier.co.uk, 30th August 2013, 
http://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/local/fife/horror-at-bedroom-tax-suicide-bid-1.125447; O. Clay, ‘Man cuts 
throat with knife in bedroom tax protest’, Liverpool Echo, 26th July 2013, 
http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/man-cuts-throat-knife-runcorn-5327123; K. Mudie & N. 
Nelson, ‘Bedroom tax victim commits suicide: Grandmother Stephanie Bottrill blames government in tragic 
note’, Daily Mirror, 12th May 2013, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/suicide-bedroom-tax-victim-
stephanie-1883600#.UY88S_pPnNM.twitter 
44 Lord Freud, the welfare minister, however, caused the death-knell of this attempt to circumvent the policy in 
a letter to social landlords.  He wrote: ‘…we would expect the designation of a property to be consistent for 
both Housing Benefit and rent purposes. Blanket redesignations without a clear and justifiable reason, and 
without reductions in rent, are inappropriate and do not fall within the spirit of the policy’.  Further, ‘Where it 
is found that a local authority has re-designated properties without reasonable grounds and without reducing 
rents, my Department would consider either restricting or not paying their Housing Benefit subsidy’. 
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most vulnerable a few months ago, but they were on the margins, facing fragility and 
housing stress, with little extra income to respond to this situation and already barely coping 
with their expenses.45 
 The Tories, of course, pilloried her (and it is significant that Rolnick is a ‘her’: ‘a woman from Brazil’, 
as Shapps described her,46 and complained of her bias and that her report was an ‘absolute disgrace’ 
in a letter to the UN47); and the Tory press added the epithet ‘loony’ and ‘loopy’, even stooping to 
describe her as a ‘dabbler in witchcraft who offered an animal sacrifice to Marx’.48 
Legal challenge 
There are two elements to this section.  The first relates to the judicial reviews of the bedroom tax.  
The second relates to the ‘jurisprudence’ as it developed in the First Tier Tribunal.  Here, the oddest 
things occurred and outcomes varied widely.  Here, until recently, we entered into the land of 
Brobdingnag.49  What binds these together in our analysis, though, is that – whether they like it or 
not - they are bound by the law.  Whether they be cause lawyers, politically active or otherwise, 
judges or advocates, the arguments discussed in this section are forced in to the law bottleneck; 
they cannot be outside the law.  They may see themselves as being up against the law but the law 
engulfs them and, win or lose, triumphs (to adapt the well-known expression ‘I fought the law and 
the law won’).50 
 
Judicial reviews51 
As regards these challenges, which have hitherto been largely unsuccessful, our argument (which is 
hardly novel to socio-legal scholars) is that judicial review has the effect of bottlenecking the stories 
of the applicants and making them irrelevant.52  Thus, in the leading case on the social sector 
bedroom tax, MA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the facts of the 10 cases are relegated 
to an Appendix to the judgment, which is much more concerned with the policy process on which 
there is a splurge of information.53  In all but one case, the claimants contended that they needed an 
extra bedroom because another member of the household (child, adult child or partner) was 
disabled. In the other case, the claimant suffered from obsessive compulsive disorder; he had filled 
two rooms with papers and contended that he could not move to smaller accommodation.  The only 
time these facts get prayed in aid of the judgment is to demonstrate that the regulations plainly 
                                                          
45 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13706&LangID=E.  
46 https://redbrickblog.wordpress.com/2013/09/11/a-woman-from-brazil/.  
47 http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24046094.  
48 http://www.channel4.com/news/bedroom-tax-un-grant-shapps-brazil-row; 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2418204/Raquel-Rolnik-A-dabbler-witchcraft-offered-animal-
sacrifice-Marx.html.  
49 That is, an enormous space but the maps to get there are contradictory. 
50 Bourdieu, op cit n 9; Bankowski & Mungham, op cit n 6. 
51 These cases have largely been dealt with in an excellent way by Neville Harris, in his excellent ‘Welfare 
reform and the shifting threshold of support for disabled people’, (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 888, 920-5.  
This section is designed simply to add further observations. 
52 In a related context, Lord Neuberger said, ‘…save in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be wrong 
in principle to have any regard to the housing circumstances and requirements of an individual applicant when 
considering the validity of a housing allocation scheme under Part 6 of the 1996 Act; R(Ahmad) Newham LBC 
[2009] UKHL 14, [60]. 
53 Cf Burnip v Birmingham CC, Trengove v Walsall MBC, and Gorry v Wiltshire CC [2012] EWCA Civ 629. 
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discriminate against the claimants under Article 14, Schedule 1, Human Rights Act 1998.54  But that is 
a throwaway point because it is so clear (despite the Secretary of State’s argument to the contrary). 
Similarly in the case of whether a claimant occupying a three bedroom property, one bedroom of 
which was a sanctuary because of domestic violence, it was put as follows: 
As I have observed, the Sanctuary Scheme is obviously a good thing, both in the case of A 
and in the case of others who have endured domestic violence. The evidence I have about 
this applicant suggests that she is a deserving recipient of the benefits that scheme can 
bring, and common sense suggests that it would be best for everyone if she were able to 
stay in her current property. It has been her home for 25 years, and has been adapted to 
provide her with the security she deserves. There are also the points which can be made 
about the uncertainty of future funding and the effect of that on someone in the position of 
A. I do not underestimate that matter. As I say, it seems to me that the benefits of a 
Sanctuary Scheme go well beyond the physical security offered by adapting a property. For A 
it has brought the security of knowing that she can stay where she is, with her support 
network around her. The loss of that certainty is not a good thing. 
But whilst these factors and the human effect of all this on A and those like her weighs in the 
balance, the question I have to determine is not simply whether it would be a good idea to 
put A's home in jeopardy. It is whether the Defendant's decision to adopt this policy (or to 
implement it in this way) is manifestly without reasonable foundation.55 
Our supplementary argument is that government is a learning organisation.  It learnt from its 
unsuccessful defence to the private rented sector regulations, and, with these cases, it provided the 
court with a welter of information about the policy process.  We learn, for example, how the 
government considered making an exception for disabled persons living in adapted accommodation, 
but decided against doing so.   
From August 2011 onwards, there was a consistent view within Government that the most 
workable solution to the difficulties for the disabled that would result from the introduction 
of the bedroom criteria was to increase what could be made available through DHPs. In a 
paper dated 2 September, the officials provided more information on the expected response 
to an increase in the DHP package as the best means of mitigating the effect of the under-
occupation measure for ‘hard cases’ such as people living in adapted accommodation. Para 4 
of the paper stated that those living in adapted accommodation had been singled out by the 
‘lobby’ as a group that should be exempted from the measure (mostly) on cost grounds. The 
officials stated that they had explored the possibility of an exemption for this group and 
other types of ‘hard cases’ which had been flagged up by stakeholders. They had concluded 
that trying to define ‘significantly adapted accommodation’ for exemption purposes would 
not be workable. Such an exemption would be difficult and expensive to deliver effectively, 
especially when Universal Credit was introduced. It would either be too broad brush or leave 
out many other equally deserving hard cases.56 
                                                          
54 [39]. 
55 [2015] EWHC 159 (Admin), [62]-[63]. 
56 MA, [11]. 
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The Court of Appeal found that it was open to the Secretary of State not to legislate for an imprecise 
class of persons to whom the criteria would not apply.  In essence, this would produce too much 
uncertainty and complexity in the system.57 
Given that the question was whether or not the regulations were ‘manifestly without reasonable 
foundation’,58 the DWP was always going to get over this low obstacle with that extra information.  
Mere disagreement is not sufficient to meet the threshold; nor are reasonable grounds for criticism; 
nor that the line has been drawn imperfectly.59  Added in to the mix that the regulations had been 
discussed by Parliament, and, in particular, ‘some of the alleged shortcomings in the scheme that 
have been canvassed before us were debated in Parliament’, the Court was even less likely to find 
them unlawful on the grounds of discrimination.60 
However, all of this left the DWP with another problem.  The reason why they were successful in the 
main has been the existence of the discretionary housing payments scheme.  This underlined their 
success in MA and the subsequent cases, Rutherford v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and 
AR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.61  In MA, Lord Dyson MR said, ‘In combination, 
[Duncan Smith’s] reasons are far from irrational. Central to his thinking is the idea that there are 
certain groups of persons whose needs for assistance with payment of their rent are better dealt 
with by DHPs than HB’.62 
Much of the discussion at first instance in Rutherford concerned essentially the academic nature of 
the question.  That is, the Rutherfords had been guaranteed DHP from the commencement date 
through to April 2015.  The child was to turn 16 in October 2015.  Pembrokeshire had effectively 
undertaken to consider whether to extend the DHP in this case and Stuart-Smith J suggested that ‘it 
would appear perverse for Pembrokeshire to reach a contrary decision in the future if the scheme 
and the Claimants’ circumstances remain unchanged’.63  The DHP award had ‘plugged the gap’, and, 
although DHPs were discretionary, the local authority was obliged to exercise its discretion in 
accordance with public law principles and human rights legislation. One consequence of this is that 
the legal challenges have now morphed in to challenges against local authority discretionary housing 
payments policies.64 
                                                          
57 The Court was able to distinguish Burnip because (at [64]) Burnip was concerned with a different scheme; 
DHP had changed and been increased; the evolution of the policy many not have been before the court in 
Burnip; and the Regulations that were being considered in Burnip were not made under the shadow of the 
financial crisis and the need to reduce public spending which the Coalition Government was elected in 2010 to 
bring about. 
58 This was because the discrimination was indirect, in the Thlimennos sense; although it was said that the test 
was the same whatever the discrimination in the context of benefits: Humphreys v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2012] UKSC 18, [2012] 1 WLR 1545, Baroness Hale(which appeared after Burnip and possibly is 
one reason why the outcomes between the cases were different). 
59 R (RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] AC 311, [57], Lord Neuberger.  As Lord Dyson MR 
put it in MA, at [80], ‘The stringent nature of the test requires the court to be satisfied that there is a serious 
flaw in the scheme which produces an unreasonable discriminatory effect’. 
60 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] 3 WLR 179, [44], Lord Sumption; Black v Wilkinson [2013] EWCA Civ 820, 
[2013] 1 WLR 2490, [46]-[49]. 
61 Respectively [2014] EWHC 1613 (Admin); [2015] EWHC 159. 
62 [82]. 
63 [53]; thus effectively binding the council to pay DHP until that time. 
64 See, for example, R (Gargett) v Lambeth LBC [2008] EWCA Civ 1450; R(Winder) v Sandwell MBC [2014] EWHC 
2617 (Admin); R(Hardy) v Sandwell MBC [2015] EWHC 890. 
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When the cases reached the Court of Appeal, both Rutherford and A were successful.65  The Court 
distinguished MA on the basis that these two cases raised specific, discernible and certain categories 
with limited numbers (particularly sanctuary schemes).66  The actual facts of the cases were again 
irrelevant – the real issue was whether DHPs saved the scheme and whether MA was distinguishable 
on the facts.  It was held that they did not in these limited cases.  In Rutherford, the Secretary of 
State had got himself in a twist effectively.  He argued that an extra bedroom is required for the 
carer of a disabled adult but not for the carer of a disabled child because the latter would be cared 
for by family members.  That did not wash with the Court, which exposed the problematic reasoning 
in the following way: 
[T]he Secretary of State did not address how the distinction could be justified by reference 
to the best interests of a child as a primary consideration. He justified the distinction 
between making provision for a bedroom for disabled children but not for disabled adults by 
reference to the best interests of the child and explained the different treatment on that 
basis. On that basis, it seems to us very difficult to justify the treatment within the same 
regulation of carers for disabled children and disabled adults, where precisely the opposite 
result is achieved; provision for the carers of disabled adults but not for the carers of 
disabled children. In this context, moreover, the argument based on the promotion of 
independent living for adults, whereas children can be cared for within the family, has little 
purchase. 
The outcome of this Court of Appeal decision, then, can be presented as a triumph of liberal law and 
reason.  Liberal law, in its objectivity and technical garb, has beaten the DWP.67  However, it can 
equally be seen as an extremely limited break on the policy and, of course, the bedroom tax remains 
for the significant majority of those others affected.  The limits of law here must be acknowledged, 
particularly as regards benefits – court reverses of policy are regularly simply overturned by further 
regulations in a “cat and mouse” game.68  Further, the distinction between these cases and MA is 
rather harder to fathom.  Simply because these cases were specific and small in number made the 
challenges successful, so that the broader bedroom tax policy wasn’t threatened; because MA 
involved a more generic challenge to the policy, it was unsuccessful.  Such distinctions are what give 
liberal law its life blood but look like a method of avoiding the significant questions about the effects 
of the bedroom tax on households – a luxury enjoyed by the senior courts. 
 
Into Brobdingnag69 
Two themes emerged in the bedroom tax decisions before the First Tier tribunal (‘FTT’): (a) what is a 
‘bedroom’? and (b) when can MA be distinguished? 
As regards the first question, some wild and wacky arguments were put to (and accepted by) the FTT 
which suggests that the proper test can be derived from the overcrowding provisions in the Housing 
Act 1985 (specifically sections 324-6), the Housing Health and Safety Rating System in the Housing 
                                                          
65 [2016] EWCA Civ 29. 
66 “MA makes a clear distinction between a broad class for which DHPs are appropriate, and a narrow class for 
which DHPs are not appropriate. The case of A is within the narrow class covered by the decision in Burnip”, 
[53]. 
67 See, for example, P. Butler, “Appeal court rules bedroom tax discriminatory in two cases”, The Guardian, 27th 
January 2016. 
68 D. Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (2011), ch 8. 
69 Ordinarily, of course, the decisions discussed in this section would not be available.  However, they can be 
found at http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/bedroom-tax-ftt-decisions/.  
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Act 2004, and, perhaps most interesting, drawing on dicta of Lord Bingham in Uratemp Ventures v 
Collins.70   
In SC231/13/01993 and SC236/13/0942, Judge Moss’ position was that those arguments were 
essentially addressing other issues and were outside the context of the bedroom tax.  The latter was 
a question of fact, not law.  It is an ordinary English word.  The question was one of both objective 
and subjective criteria, of course decided at the date of the decision (but the actual room use at the 
date of the decision is not determinative – her point was that this is not a once and for all decision as 
individual circumstances change).  Objectively, would that room normally be classed as a bedroom?  
Subjectively, are there any particularly circumstances which would suggest that a room normally 
considered a bedroom should not be one?  Further, a bedroom had to be considered in the light of 
‘home’ (in respect of which benefit is payable71).  Home connoted a degree of privacy and sanctuary, 
personal space as well as being somewhere to sleep. 
Thus, in SC236/13/0942, it became apparent after a home visit that the room classed as a bedroom 
actually had a lift going in to it and required sufficient space for a wheelchair etc.  A bed could just 
about have been squeezed in to the room but there would have been no privacy or sanctuary: ‘It is 
the need for the use of the lift which takes this room out of the definition of a bedroom in a home’. 
Much of the nonsense has been put to rest by the Upper Tribunal decision in SSWP v Nelson and Fife 
Council.72  This draws attention to ‘…a number of case sensitive factors will need to be considered 
including (a) size, configuration and overall dimensions, (b) access, (c) natural and electric lighting, 
(d) ventilation, and (e) privacy’.73  Room sizes for overcrowding rules are irrelevant, however. 
On the second question, distinguishing MA and Rutherford, perhaps the most remarkable FTT 
decision was in the case of Carmichael.  Mr and Mrs Carmichael’s case had been considered 
explicitly in MA, in which the Court of Appeal made clear that their case was caught by the 
regulations.  However, when the case was remitted to the FTT, it found in favour of the Carmichaels 
on the ground that they were discriminated against.74  The basis for this decision was that, while MA 
was a judicial review of the scheme, this was a statutory appeal of an individual decision.  Oddly, 
Judge Watson said that he did not find MA ‘… particularly helpful in dealing with the case’.75  In other 
cases, the FTT has distinguished MA and Rutherford where DHP has not ‘plugged the gap’, a position 
which seems the logical outcome of the DWP’s position.76 
 
Bedroom tax and the uses of twitter 
In this section, our discussion is preceded by a review of the literature on social media, social 
movements, and protest.  We then provide a short description of twitter for the uninitiated, 
following which we move to our case study.  We draw attention to the development of the label 
‘bedroom tax’, and argue that Twitter was the space where the label became solidified, or perhaps 
                                                          
70 [2001] UKHL 43, in which Lord Bingham said that the use of the room was to be judged at the date on which 
the decision was made. 
71 S. 130 SSCBA 1992. 
72 [2014] UKUT 525 (AAC) 
73 [31] 
74 SC068/13/12054, Tribunal Judge Watson; see also the decision of Judge McMahon in SC068/14/01608. 
75 Para 15. 
76 Mr Gresham’s case, SC008/13/08128, in which the court expressed scepticism about the lawfulness of the 
local authority’s DHP policy. 
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better ‘stablilised’,77 as representing the benefit reduction, despite other attempts (on Twitter and 
other spaces) to produce different labels.  We then draw attention to our four interview 
participants’ involvement.  To protect their anonymity, we have used sobriquets as descriptors: ‘the 
smiling assassin’; ‘the understater’; ‘the legal conduit’; ‘the social media polymath’ (who was also 
involved in a bedroom tax challenge).   
During 2014, we conducted telephone interviews with them, deciding on that method so that their 
anonymity could be protected (in three cases, the twitter name was not the real name of the 
research participant – however, in two such cases, there are links to their blogs which contain details 
about them).  Only one of the participants was known to us prior to the study.  Between the four of 
them, they had over 16,000 followers and had tweeted over 85,000 times.78  The interviews lasted 
between 40 minutes to an hour and a half.  Obviously, this is an exploratory study and we can do no 
more than draw some basic, limited messages from our data.   
The key point is that, despite only a limited sample, Twitter has the potential to work alongside 
other strategies and tactics to flatten structures of power so that four, relatively ordinary individuals, 
who feel passionately about the bedroom tax, can affect our understandings as well as get people to 
do things;79 or to put it another way, they open up fields of knowledge and action.80  We are not 
suggesting in any sense that these four have somehow changed the world of the bedroom tax, which 
remains in place in any event, but as four ordinary people with a social media computer programme 
on their smartphones, they have considerable power. It is fair and right to say that they are all male, 
so that this flattening of power in this case study is only partial.81 
We are also interested in the ways in which legality is enfolded in to their actions.  As they tweet, we 
argue that they are (consciously and/or unconsciously) producing legality.  The names we have given 
them (which are not artificially constructed labels, but phrases they used in their interviews, and 
have been agreed with them) and their practices are imbued with legalism, as we discuss below.   
Social media, social movements and protest 
 
There is little doubt that, since 2009 at the latest, social media has become intertwined with social 
movements and protest.  In 2009, it was reported that ‘There may have been few things that 
protesters, politicians and activists share, but during the G20 meeting, they were united by their use 
of Twitter’.82  One of the key questions now addressed in the literature is not whether social media is 
                                                          
77 See E. Cloatre, Pills for the Poorest (2013), 14: ‘the “translation” of multiple connections into a new actor 
with a sense or appearance of stability is at the core of much [ANT] research’. 
78 As at 13th April 2015. 
79 Cf the critique of the #bringbackourgirls as hashtag politics: http://jeffar.es/2014/05/11/subterranean-
hashtag-blues/ 
80 M. Foucault, ‘Afterword: The subject and power’, in H. Dreyfuss & P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982), 221.  As he puts it earlier, in discussing antiauthority oppositions, 
‘They are an opposition to the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence, and 
qualification: struggles against the privileges of knowledge.  But they are also an opposition against secrecy, 
deformation, and mystifying representations imposed on people’. 
81 It is important to make this point in the context of the more general issue about the ‘trolling’ of female 
tweeps. 
82 M. Ward, ‘Twitter on the front line’, BBC News, 2nd April 2009: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7979378.stm 
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related to social movements and protest action, but how it does so and under what conditions it 
relates to them.83   
On the one hand, there are those who regard the capacities of social media, particularly twitter, to 
produce networked populations, with decentralised and horizontal power structures, which 
facilitated the development of new forms of activism.84  The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings and 
Occupy movements are often held up as examples of this technological development.85  On the 
other hand, there are those who have expressed concerns at the development of new methods of 
controlling dissenting populations, but, more pertinent to this article, that it develops what has 
become known as ‘slacktivism’ – activism with minimal personal effort (such as clicking ‘like’ to a 
post) that has no social or political impact.86 
These polarised positions have given rise to a third set of literatures, which have provided more 
nuanced positions.  Juris, for example, a student of Castells (the doyen of the network analysis), has 
argued that the widespread use of social media by activists has created a ‘”logic of aggregation,” 
which involves the assembling of masses of individuals from diverse backgrounds within physical 
spaces’; further, it offers ‘an alternative cultural framework that is shaped by our interactions with 
social media and generates particular patterns of social and political interaction that involve the viral 
flow of information and subsequent aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete 
physical spaces’.87Gerbaudo’s analysis also fits in to this more patchwork theoretical framework.  His 
use of the term choreography, as a writing of movement or action, particularly resonates with this 
study; but his study also stresses the significance of participants’ emotional investment in protest, 
which potentially breaks down, or works with, the individualisation inherent in the consumption of 
social media.88 
What binds these studies of social movements together is their relationship with forms of protest 
that are combined with some physical co-location of populations.  Hence, these studies emphasise 
the ways in which physical space becomes entangled with virtual space.  What is distinctive about 
our study is its engagement with modern forms of legality, itself an individualising set of narratives 
which does not require physical spaces per se.89  Nevertheless, the kinds of discussions above 
prompt us (again) that we should not over-claim for the use of twitter as well as providing a useful 
vocabulary for discussing protest. 
Twitter: A note for the uninitiated 
 
                                                          
83 See, for example, S. Valenzuela, ‘Unpacking the use of social media for protest behaviour: The roles of 
information, opinion expression, and activism’, (2013) 57(2) American Behavioral Scientist 920, 921. 
84 Most notably here is the network analysis developed by Manuel Castells in his trilogy, the last of which, 
Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (2012). 
85 Cf M. Lim, ‘Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: Social media and oppositional movements in Egypt, 2004-11’ 
(2012) 62(2) Journal of Communication 231, which provides a corrective to this analysis, arguing that, seen 
over a longer time frame as well as activist strategies.  The argument there is that ‘social media represent tools 
and spaces in which various communication networks that make up social movement emerge, connect, 
collapse, and expand’ (at p 234). 
86 The term derives from E. Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (2011). 
87 J. Juris, ‘Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social media, public space, and emerging logics of aggregation’, 
(2011) 39(2) American Ethnologist 259, 260 and 266; it is important to Juris’ position that these logics of 
aggregation exist alongside the networking logics – thus, he refers to the generation of ‘crowds of individuals’. 
88 Gerbaudo, op cit n 12, ch 2. 
89 Cf the kinds of housing protests discussed by D. Cowan and S. Wheeler, ‘The reach of human rights’, in T. Xu 
and J. Allain (eds), Property and Human Rights in a Global Context (2015). 
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A tweet is a form of micro-blog posted on the host site, Twitter.  It is made up of 140 characters 
(including spaces etc), and sometimes known as a ‘microblog’ (a particularly useful label, as a tweet 
might link to other social media outlets, such as blogs).  It is posted by an individual or organisation 
(sometimes known as a ‘tweep’) with an address beginning with the @ symbol.  One’s ‘followers’ (ie 
those people who press a button on Twitter to follow you) then receive the micro-blog.  In turn, 
those followers may ‘retweet’ or ‘modify and retweet’,90 so that a micro-blog has the potential to 
reach an unlimited number of followers.  Similarly, one can reply to a tweet (although a quirk of 
Twitter is that a reply can only be seen by those who follow both parties if a full stop or something 
else is put at the start of the reply) and ‘favourite’ a tweet (which essentially just saves it to your 
account).   
Tweets range from the mundane (food, train journeys etc) to the commercial (advertising) to the 
political to the abusive (known as ‘trolls’).  They provide a valuable, if occasionally limited, source of 
information about specialist subject areas.  The hashtag is used in a tweet to denote a subject-
matter, an event (such as a conference), or sometimes simply for amusement.  It enables people, 
not just one’s followers, to follow a theme which can be searched and saved.  So, for example, the 
hashtag #UKhousing might be used by a tweep to follow and/or join a debate on that subject.   
Key to its significance is that the twitter programme is available not just on a desktop computer but 
loaded (often preloaded) on to smartphones and tablets, with an email alert when a person tweets 
at you, retweets or replies to you or favourites a tweet you have written.  It is an easy-access, readily 
available programme on which random thoughts and considered opinions are posted.  Apparently, 
there are 974 million existing twitter accounts, although a considerable proportion are inactive.91  
Celebrities have millions of followers and, no doubt, armies of tweeters on their behalf.92  Grant 
Shapps, the current Conservative Party Chairman, who plays a central role (as Housing Minister) in 
the case study in this paper, was said to have found a way to increase his followers to over 55,000.93  
As Jeffares asks rhetorically, ‘what proportion of think tanks, columnists, politicians, senior civil 
servants, journalists, newspapers, media organisations, social scientists, bloggers, researchers, 
lobbyists and consultants are not on twitter?’.94 
 
Labelling 
The battle of the bedroom tax was as much a battle of the label as it was over policy.95  In 
Gerbaudo’s terms, there were a multiplicity of choreographers initiating and guiding the label, but 
its production as the ‘bedroom tax’ allowed for ‘the symbolic condensation of people around a 
common identity and their material precipitation in public space’.96   
                                                          
90 This practice is commonly preceded by ‘RT’ and ‘MT’. 
91 E. Sherman, ‘Many twitter users don’t tweet, finds report’, CBS Moneywatch, 14 April 2014, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/many-twitter-users-dont-tweet-finds-report/ 
92 See, for example, http://twopcharts.com/twoplist.  One of us, after tweeting that they had been out on a 
#JLS dinner, found that they were followed (and then unfollowed) by numerous fans of the pop group, JLS. 
93 P. Wintour, ‘The rise and fall of Grant Shapps’ twitter followers’, The Guardian, 7th September 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/sep/07/grant-shapps-twitter-followers-analysis.  Shapps’ activities 
on Twitter have been ‘storified’ – a programme which pulls together various tweets commonly with a hashtag 
– at https://storify.com/anyapalmer/grant-shapps.  Shapps currently has 84.4 thousand followers. 
94 See S. Jeffares, Interpreting Hashtag Politics: Policy Ideas in an Era of Social Media (2014), p 6. 
95 A. Marsh, ‘The battle over the “bedroom tax”: Politics, rationality and discourse’, paper presented to the 
European Network of Housing Research Conference, 2014. 
96 Op cit n 11, 44. 
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The regulations, themselves, describe the rules as the ‘Maximum rent (Social Sector)’.  Originally, the 
DWP termed them fairly neutrally as the ‘social sector size criteria’, but this quickly morphed in to 
‘under-occupation of social housing’.97  That had provided one of the rationales for the policy in the 
label and effectively advanced the fairness rationale.  The ‘bedroom tax’ label appears to have begun 
in a speech given by the crossbench peer,98 Lord Best, who has been a well-known figure in UK 
housing for nearly 50 years.  From his point of view, it was a tax because occupiers had nowhere to 
move to and they had to pay a levy to the Exchequer.  His point was that everybody was suffering – 
tenants and housing providers – and this was fundamentally unfair.  As Marsh acknowledges, the 
‘tax’ label ‘is a fairly familiar tactic in British political debate, because we know it can work to 
undermine a policy’, viz. the poll tax, pasty tax, caravan tax; although the bedroom tax is not a tax in 
and of itself, but a reduction in personal subsidy.99  And, of course, the tax label has particular 
emotional connotations, providing an impetus during a period of initiation of protest and an 
attraction to gatherings during the phase of sustainment.100 
The DWP has referred to the policy as the ‘spare room subsidy’.  Its reasons for so doing are clear, in 
that it seeks to neutralise the unfairness of a tax on bedrooms by reference to the idea of a subsidy 
for spare rooms as an appeal to a common sense proposition about the unfairness of that spare 
room/s (in the social sector, at any rate).  Indeed, all documentation about the bedroom tax 
produced by the DWP now uses this label and has done since 27th February 2013.101  In fact, Grant 
Shapps appears to have been the progenitor of this label, having tweeted that he would be 
appearing on a Radio 4 programme to debate the ‘spare room subsidy’.102  But, by this stage, the 
bedroom tax label had stuck.103  Indeed, in a memorable moment of Parliamentary irony on 24th 
October 2013, Lord Freud, the welfare minister, criticised the ‘bedroom tax’ label, but then went on 
to use it himself.104 
Whether or not the Labour party had adopted the ‘bedroom tax’ label, common usage was clearly 
established by early 2013.  Jeffares conducted an analysis of tweets posted over 72 hours between 
8-11th April 2013 where the terms bedroom tax, #bedroomtax, spare room subsidy and 
#spareroomsubsidy were used.  Of a total of 8,155 tweets, which he estimated as being 
approximately 80 per cent of Twitter traffic, 7,936 used either ‘bedroom tax’ or #bedroomtax (this 
                                                          
97 Exemplified in the impact assessment title. 
98 This, in turn, echoed the National Housing Federation’s position (of which Best was a long-time chair): 
Jeffares, 2014, 129. 
99 We are, of course, in danger of dancing on the head of a pin here.  If one considers the housing benefit part 
of a claimant’s property, as the new property thesis might do, then a reduction in amount operates as a tax.  
There is also a pragmatic reason for the ‘tax’ label – it simply uses fewer of the available 140 characters in a 
tweet. 
100 Gerbaudo, op cit n 12, 44. 
101 Paul Lewis Money, ‘DWP FOI on first use of phrase “spare room subsidy”’, 
http://paullewismoney.blogspot.co.uk/2014/06/foi-response-on-use-of-phrase-spare.html. This terms appears 
to have superseded the label ‘under-occupation penalty’. 
102 Tweet, 17th February 2013; see Jules Birch, ‘Welfare, the bedroom tax and the battle of language’, 
https://julesbirch.wordpress.com/2013/08/02/welfare-the-bedroom-tax-and-the-battle-of-language/.  
103 Indeed, Duncan-Smith made a formal complaint against the BBC of bias because of their use of the 
‘bedroom tax’ label: A. Glennie, ‘Duncan Smith blasts BBC for “bedroom tax” bias; Work and Pensions 
Secretary accuses corporation of promoting Labour’s views in furious letter’, Daily Mail, 28th October 2013. 
104 N. Nelson, ‘Lord Freud says bedroom tax term is misleading … then refers to it as bedroom tax himself’, 
Sunday People, 27th October 2013. 
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included re-tweets or quoted tweets).105  This suggests a particular moment when the harnessing of 
social media (alongside other sources) produced the label. 
Strategising social media: Protest and legality 
In combination, our four research participants, using different strategies of everyday life, have had 
considerable effects in structuring the fields of action.  However, for the purposes of this analysis we 
group them into two predominant strategies.  The first are two information providers (the 
Understater and the Legal Conduit); the second are challengers (the Smiling Assassin and the Social 
Media Polymath).  Both sets of strategies used twitter for legal effects.  This is particularly the case in 
respect of the challengers, who were the most vocal forms of legal protester (albeit in different 
ways), seeking to operate against the law.  That is, they sought to use the formal law against itself, 
and twitter was used to distribute a ‘how to’ set of knowledges.  However, the information providers 
mobilised their information tactically, providing explicit or implicit instructions to others to challenge 
the policy.106  We might see them as gaming the law, showing its fissures and cracks.  However, it is 
important that our organising trope here is no more and no less than that, ie a method of organising 
our data.  As Ewick and Silbey themselves suggest, ‘… a person may express, through words or 
actions, a multifaceted and possibly contradictory consciousness’.107  Further, they themselves are 
simply labels, conveyances of meaning (like the bedroom tax label itself), which are overly simplistic, 
and overly structured, so we must recognise that our participants’ narratives do not easily shoehorn 
in to these categories.  
The information providers 
In two cases, the Understater and the legal conduit, the provision of information was essentially the 
anti-authority challenge.  Apparently neutral information could be tweeted to significant effect; 
knowledge could be used to challenge apparently authoritative accounts of the bedroom tax by a 
single tweet.  The Understater108 tweeted about welfare reform generally and focused mostly on the 
provision of formal media reports which he trawled (‘it has become part of my job’).  He became 
involved in Twitter ‘… as an opportunity to try to effect change and to push out the message that I 
wanted to get out there.  For this specific purpose, my frustration was that central government 
rhetoric about welfare recipients and negative stereotyping did not correspond with my day-to-day 
experience’.109  His passion was social justice and he communicated that emotion through the 
understatement of tweets – sometimes just with a headline and a weblink to a local newspaper 
(‘grabbed’ by a web-based sorting agent), adding in the local MP’s twitter address so that the MP 
saw it.  He sought to be balanced about the bedroom tax in his tweets, suggesting that ‘some 
campaigners are their own worst enemy’.  He had written a piece on Facebook about the bedroom 
tax which had 80,000 ‘shares’.  His strategy was to give a tweet a visual look, through the use of 
returns, include specific MPs in his local tweets, and amplify a headline in a tweet.  He told us that 
he was ‘compelled to do it; it’s within me; if I don’t push back on what I see as anti-evidential words 
and phrases coming out of central government then I can’t stop myself.  Some things come out and I 
grab my phone to tweet something about it’.  As he put it, ‘retweeting is always nice when it goes a 
bit crazy’. 
The Legal Conduit came to the bedroom tax in part in response to his followers and, in part, because 
people began to send him their FTT judgments.  Recognising that these were not readily available (as 
                                                          
105 129-30. 
106 See J. Lemert, Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion after all? (1981); Valenzuela, op cit n 89. 
107 At p. 50. 
108 So-called because, as he said, ‘understatement is the most powerful thing on twitter’. 
109 The understater is a housing professional. 
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they are unpublished) but that they might be useful as a legal resource for others, including but not 
limited to his followers, he blogged about them and tweeted the blog.  Twitter was, in this sense, a 
way to publicise his blog (which is read over 35,000 times per month)110 and the judgments (‘I wasn’t 
expecting them to be quite that barking … You expect a certain degree of reasoning from a [FTT] but 
I wasn’t expecting the disparity, possibly on some issues, but not on the generality’).  However, he 
also saw himself as being the ‘pessimistic voice of legal reason’ against other apparently 
authoritative, positive tweep voices.  The Legal Conduit is very aware that his blog and Twitter 
account are followed by judges and the DWP (which apparently was circulating his notes). 
Although it may seem easier to say that the Legal Conduit’s approach was ‘legal’ – indeed, like the 
lawyers striving to beat law through law, he was simply providing information about law - but we like 
to think that his was a rather more subversive use of legality than a simplistic and superficial label 
conveys.  He recognised (and was theoretically adept enough to recognise) that information about 
law can make things happen.  He was not looking for clients, but offering a service, demonstrating 
where the potential fault lines in law lay.  He was both inside and outside law in that sense.  The 
Understater, though, was also agitating for legal change.  His apparently neutral approach belied a 
clear political (in a narrow sense) goal - a hope that through the provision of information, politicians 
would see sense – and he adopted an ‘effects of the law’ approach to obtain that legal change. 
Neither of these tweeps could be regarded as ‘slacktivists’ (although a retweet could be regarded as 
an example of slacktivism).  They were professionals with a significant following, whose 
dissemination of mobilising information to that following was a recognition of the values and uses of 
information in both online and offline participation.111  They were both informal ‘leaders’ (although 
neither would style themselves like that), using twitter to open different windows on the protest 
space; or to use a different metaphor, choreographing different spaces.112  Certainly, the Legal 
Conduit was seeking to provide an alternative perspective about the prospects of success of 
challenging a bedroom tax determination through particular sets of arguments, and publicising the 
judgments of the FTT supporting or dismissing those arguments.  The Understater was seeking to 
change political thought, or at least the image of the recipient of state support for housing, his 
tweets predominantly reflecting his passionate belief in social justice and the appalling presentation 
of such recipients by some politicians and right wing print and other media (including tweeps). 
 
The challengers 
The challengers were both active, albeit in different ways, in challenging the bedroom tax.  The 
Smiling Assassin’s strategy was to destroy the bedroom tax from within, principally by using 
techniques of administrative justice,113 and creating a model letter requesting extensive further 
information of the housing benefit authority, such as for policies regarding the definition of a 
‘bedroom’.  The purpose of that letter was as much to highlight the inadequacies of the law’s failure 
                                                          
110 He told us that a single tweet leads to over 200 new visits to his blog. 
111 Valenzuela, op cit n 89, 925. 
112 As Segerberg and Bennett put it, ‘Twitter is interesting as an organizing mechanism within the specific 
protest ecology.  As well as transmitting information, networked protest spaces constitute negotiated spheres 
of individual and collective agency.  As digital and social media become increasingly prominent, they too 
become networking agents … within the protest space’: A. Segerberg & W. Bennett, ‘Social media and the 
organization of collective action: Using twitter to explore the ecologies of two climate change protests’, (2011) 
14(3) The Communication Review 197, 201. 
113 See, for example, R. Thomas, ‘Administrative justice, better decisions, and organisational learning’, [2015] 
PL 111. 
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to define what constitutes a ‘bedroom’ in law as it was to put a spanner in the bureaucracy 
administering the benefit.  For, rather than legal challenges, the Smiling Assassin had a strategy.  It 
was to ‘swamp’ housing benefit offices with review requests and appeals against bedroom tax 
assessments; he highlighted dreadful practices of social landlords and local housing benefit offices; 
he praised ‘good’ practices (such as some landlords decisions to re-classify properties as having less 
bedrooms, although this negatively affected their income stream).  
He developed a model housing benefit review letter which those affected could modify and send 
out.  The strategy was to defeat the money-saving logic of the bedroom tax through reviews and 
appeals, with which he also assisted.  In the first three weeks of it appearing, the Smiling Assassin 
told us that his model letter had been downloaded 180,000 times.  As he put it: 
If every tenant affected by the bedroom tax decision appealed then the system is brought to 
its knees.  The government expects just 3% to appeal and estimates an appeal costs the local 
council £200.  It won’t and it will cost the council £1500 for everyone that appeals and about 
£18m to [X] Council if all 12,000 appeal. 
Such was the significance of this letter that the Chartered Institute of Housing, the professional body 
of housing providers, issued statements decrying the strategy, while at the same time saying that 
they were working behind the scenes to disrupt the iniquitous tax.  The Smiling Assassin was clearly 
interested in law, in the sense that he would assist people appearing in the FTT, but, as he put it, 
‘courts don’t dispense justice’.  His legal strategy was, in part, that he ‘just need[ed] one judge to say 
it’s ultra vires just to accept the view of landlords [ie the landlord designation of a room as a 
bedroom] without the authority checking.  It would all become unworkable’.  Social media, and 
particularly the link between Twitter and his blog, became his dissemination tools because ‘social 
media mobilises tenants but also the dissemination of shite.  Lots of what I do is dispelling myths, 
plus points and negative points’. 
The Social Media Polymath was a little different from the others in this sample.  He was a social 
tenant who was affected by the bedroom tax and who had challenged it.  He was ill and his partner 
disabled, so that their ‘spare room’ was full of medical treatment equipment.  He was also a 
campaigner.  His tweeting had, in part, opened his profile up and he had become quite prominent: 
‘Twitter has proved to be a very good way of getting our story out as it has developed.  … Following 
our story going out there was an avalanche almost of other people tweeting about their case’.  His 
strategy was simple - ‘to get people to think about the truth rather than rhetoric’.  His strategy had 
been successful, and his political and media profile was developing in diverse, almost uncontrollable 
ways.  He described his court appearance as a sort of ‘DWP, tory, IDS bullshitfest really’.  We 
discussed whether the outcome of his case had reflected how he himself had felt about his position, 
and whether, in effect, the law had represented him.  His view was that his barrister, who was 
incredibly busy, had done a good job but he wished that he could have had an hour to explain his 
case to the barrister.  Thus, the legal process had effectively silenced him, whereas his other 
strategies were enabling him to tell his story publicly. 
As Ewick and Silbey observe, legality is polyvocal and, although one can distinguish different strands 
of legality in their different approaches, they are enmeshed together.  The Smiling Assassin was 
seeking to smash the system from within, but he was at that time equally willing to bow before the 
law in his desire to get one judge to say the bedroom tax was ultra vires, even though (to him) courts 
don’t dispense the law.  The same type of complex, contradictory narrative appears in the Social 
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Media Polymath’s narrative – he actively used the law for his own individual gain but at the same 
time decried its utility, preferring to focus on a political campaign.114 
In these strategies, we can see the ways in which twitter and other social media formed part of 
broader choreographed narratives, designed either to smash the system and/or to force political 
change through drawing attention to the general and case specific iniquities of the tax.  Like the 
Legal Conduit, twitter was used as part of a broader social and general media strategy by the 
challengers.  They have affinities with Juris’ logic of aggregation, because they were responsible for 
drawing together protestors at different points.  In our appreciation, such a logic of aggregation can 
equally be the diffusion of the key messages to other physical or virtual spaces, and actants – the 
aggregation, for example, of the review letters, and the physical appearance of the characters at 
protest rallies or public debates. 
 
Conclusions: The bedroom tax and Twitter 
The denigration of the social security state by the Coalition government has been one of the defining 
features of austerity politics.  In many respects, the bedroom tax is the apotheosis of that 
denigration, producing states of insecurity for people who can ill-afford that insecurity.  The failure 
of the judicial reviews did, of course, produce one concession – that without discretionary housing 
payments, the policy potentially would have been in contravention of Article 14 discrimination.  
However, this concession is entirely in accordance with DWP policy.  It enables them to say that the 
bedroom tax has reduced housing benefit expenditure, while at the same time requiring those 
affected to be reliant on the cash-limited, locally distributed, discretionary payment.  For a while, the 
FTT operated as some sort of break on the policy in individual cases, albeit for very odd reasons.  
However, that now appears as an aberration, more than anything else. 
Our argument in this paper, however, is both broader and simple.  Twitter is a potentially fantastic 
resource for socio-legal researchers.  It has been under-used.  Because it is so fast-moving, one can 
find the stabilisation of a particular idea, the tipping point.  It is used by the powerful for sure, and 
much Twitter-traffic is dull, but it can also be used to challenge policy and practice.  The lifetime of a 
policy idea can now be very short.  As Jeffares argues, ‘Hashtag politics is a practice of modern 
policy-making where policy ideas are coined, fostered and imbued with meaning and associations, 
before eventually being overlooked, forgotten and seldom mentioned again’.115   
Our participants offered two different ways of using Twitter for a purpose – by providing 
information, to arm their followers and other recipients with information to challenge dominant or 
apparently authoritative narratives.  We would stress the ordinariness of our research sample – with 
no disrespect to them, who probably have no other aspirations – but their reach is of significance; 
indeed, we selected them for our study precisely because of their choreographic positionality.  Thus, 
the promise of social media is that potentially it adds to the available techniques that flatten power 
                                                          
114 We see the secondary data analysed by S. Halliday and B. Morgan - ‘”I fought the law and the law won?  
Legal consciousness and the critical imagination’, (2013) 66(1) Current Legal Problems 1 - as essentially making 
the same point about polyvocality – while they acknowledge and accept the limits of totalizing schemes and 
accept that ‘much will be found in the spaces between the ends of the dimensional spectrums’, they argue 
that these discourses are theoretically productive.  
115 P 145. 
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structures and spatial imaginations.  This is spatial governmentality in action; it is uncontrollable, 
miasmic, and enables actors to jump spatial scales.116 
If socio-legal scholars are interested in the interstices between agency and structure, in 
understanding strategies of resistance, as well as the mundane (which we take to be three of the 
most significant sites of study), they should similarly be interested in following the Twitter actor 
flows.  If we do so, and make that our starting point, we may end up with a rather different set of 
understandings of legality and legal spaces.117  In this way, through our data, we have sought to 
develop an analysis of legality and protest, demonstrating how social media may offer quite 
interesting challenges to our appreciations of that literature.   
The social media literature review offered in this paper also provides sparks for socio-legal 
researchers, interested in the uses of, as well as controls in, virtual and public spaces.  We have been 
drawn particularly to the helpful analogy of choreography in this paper, as each of our participants 
was, in one way or another, seeking to choreograph aspects of protest against the bedroom tax.  
However, this literature also reminds us (if we needed reminding) of the limits of social media, and 
of the ways in which we interact both with it and beyond it.  We should be careful not to essentialise 
social media, just as we should be careful to emphasise the limits of our data. 
One particular limit of our study is that, while we can claim that our participants got things moving, 
we cannot claim a specific impact of their work beyond the attempt by the Smiling Assassin to bring 
down the decision-making bureaucracy.  It may be that many of those others are ‘slacktivists’, but it 
is also clear that targeted information provision, publicisation of other social media (like blogs), 
alongside other strategies might make a difference.  We cannot claim that twitter on its own 
provides the single successful protest resource; that would be a nonsense.  However, it does provide 
a relatively new method of co-ordinating and developing a protest dance (to continue the 
choreographic metaphor).  The bedroom tax still exists and is being propped up by the discretionary 
housing payments system.  The voices of protest remain on twitter and elsewhere in the blogging 
and political communities, and new calls for its abolition are made.  Yet, the response to the final 
research report by Lord Freud in the House of Lords was that the report demonstrated that ‘the 
policy is promoting more effective use of housing stock and encouraging people to enter work and 
increase their earnings. We will therefore be maintaining the policy and will continue to protect 
vulnerable claimants who require additional support through discretionary housing payments’.118 
There are other ways in which a study of social media might give added value, for example by 
thinking about the use of social media in reference to understandings of legal consciousness.  
Implicitly, we have drawn on that literature in this article.  This point is, perhaps obvious.  Legality is 
produced socially through twitter as it is through traditional media or in other places, like queues.  
Nevertheless, even though it may be a theoretically obvious point to make - that twitter is a site of 
                                                          
116 See, for example, A. Akinwumi, ‘Powers of reach: Legal mobilization in a post-apartheid redress campaign’, 
(2012) Social and Legal Studies 1. 
117 The perhaps counter-intuitive sociology of the door-closer by ‘Jim Johnson’, aka Bruno Latour, (in ‘Mixing 
humans and nonhumans together: The sociology of a door-closer’, (1988) 35(3) Social Problems 298) suggests 
some interesting narratives which might be developed here, particularly about human’s lack of control of 
technology.  
118 House of Lords, 22 December 2015, col 2441, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151222-0001.htm 
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legal consciousness – our relatively simple point is that this fact has been overlooked by the socio-
legal community.119 
In so doing, we have succumbed to the temptation to see legality everywhere – but, as Mezey 
suggests,120 if the law is everywhere so much that it is nowhere, how can we speak to data which is 
apparently extra-legal?  So, for example, the Understater would not describe his role or perception 
as ‘legal’, but we have interpreted his data through that lens.  That may be because of the totalising 
discourses of legality, the fact that our primary discipline is law and we consequently ‘see’ legality as 
being all around us;121 and/or the instrumental fact that this paper is designed in part as a socio-legal 
reflection on legality.  It may also be a consequence of what Cotterell regarded as the 
meaninglessness of the inside-outside demarcation between law and sociology.122  However, in 
drawing on the breadth of the idea of legality, we have also demonstrated the ways in which our 
social media users sought to challenge the right of the law to provide the official account of their 
lived realities. 
 
                                                          
119 See the interesting analysis in B. Morgan and D. Kuch, ‘Radical transactionalism: Legal consciousness, 
diverse economies, and the sharing economy’, (2015) 42(4) JLS 556. 
120 N. Mezey, ‘Out of the ordinary: Law, power, culture, and the commonplace’, (2001) 26(1) Law and Social 
Inquiry 145; see also K. Levine and V. Mellema, ‘Strategizing the street: How law matters in the lives of women 
in the street-level drug economy’, (2001) 26(1) Law and Social Inquiry 169; D. Cowan and D. Wincott, 
‘Exploring the legal’, in D. Cowan and D. Wincott (eds), Exploring the Legal, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
121 For discussion on the almost inevitable subjectivity in interpreting data, see A. Sarat, ‘Off to meet the 
wizard: Validity and reliability in the search for a post-empiricist sociology of law’, (1990) 15(1) Law and Social 
Inquiry 155. 
122 R. Cotterell, ‘Why must legal ideas be interpreted sociologically?’, 1998) 25(2) Journal of Law and Society 
171. 
